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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Warren Armstrong appeals from the 
district court's final judgment entered upon the jury's 
determination that defendant-appellee, William Dwyer, 
M.D., was not negligent in providing medical services to 
plaintiff in the course of three surgical operations and did 
not breach his duty of informed consent. He also appeals 
from the district court's orders denying his motion for a 
new trial and affirming the magistrate judge's order denying 
his motion to compel Dr. Dwyer to produce all peer review 
documents pertaining to his treatment of plaintiff. Plaintiff- 
appellant Emily Armstrong, Armstrong's wife, appeals from 
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the district court's final judgment entered against her on 
her derivative claim for loss of consortium.1 We will affirm 
the district court in all respects. 
 
I. 
 
A. Background Facts 
 
On June 20, 1991, plaintiff met with Dr. Eileen Clifford, 
an internist in practice with plaintiff's then-treating 
physician, Dr. Richard Oliver.2 Plaintiff complained of 
recurring abdominal pain, increasing fatigue, and 
cramping. He also complained of nausea and a decreased 
appetite. Dr. Clifford's preliminary assessment was that 
plaintiff had diverticulitis, a disease in which portions of 
the colon become inflamed. She prescribed a ten-day 
course of antibiotics and ordered a barium x-ray of 
plaintiff 's colon. After several days of antibiotic treatment, 
however, Dr. Oliver referred plaintiff to Dr. Dwyer for a 
surgical opinion because the radiologist's report suggested 
the possibility of an abscess in plaintiff's colon. 
 
Plaintiff met with Dr. Dwyer on July 9 and 12, 1991. Dr. 
Dwyer reviewed plaintiff 's x-ray and determined that 
plaintiff had marked diverticulitis in several areas in the 
upper portion of the sigmoid colon and a possible 
intramural abscess. Based upon this determination, as well 
as plaintiff 's medical history and the nature of his 
complaints, Dr. Dwyer recommended that plaintiff undergo 
surgery. Dr. Dwyer explained to plaintiff that he would 
remove the infected section of bowel and rejoin the two 
healthy bowel ends, a procedure known as an anastomosis. 
 
Dr. Dwyer performed the surgery on July 16, 1991. 
Initially, plaintiff 's condition appeared to improve, and he 
was discharged from the hospital on July 27, 1991. Three 
days later, however, Dwyer readmitted plaintiff after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For the sake of clarity, the court's reference to "plaintiff" herein 
includes only Mr. Armstrong unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2. All evidence and inferences therefrom are taken in the light most 
favorable to defendant, the verdict winner. See Doe v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted). 
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plaintiff complained to him about fever and pain. Dr. Dwyer 
diagnosed plaintiff with peritonitis, an infection in the 
abdominal cavity, which resulted from a leak in the 
anastomosis. 
 
Dr. Dwyer performed a second operation on plaintiff on 
July 31, 1991. Because he found extensive infection and 
dead tissue in plaintiff 's abdomen during the surgery, he 
performed a reversible colostomy with an opening or stoma 
under plaintiff 's left rib cage. Dr. Dwyer left the incision 
and wound open to heal "by secondary intention" or 
without horizontal sutures. App. at 114-15. Plaintiff was 
hospitalized for more than one month. 
 
Plaintiff met several times with Dr. Dwyer during the next 
few months. Once again, plaintiff 's overall condition 
appeared to improve, and his colostomy seemed to be 
functioning well. By November 12, 1991, however, Dr. 
Dwyer concluded that the stoma was constricting and 
additional surgery would be necessary. 
 
Dr. Dwyer performed the revisionary procedure on 
December 2, 1991 on an outpatient basis. On the following 
day, plaintiff began treatment with Dr. John McConnell, a 
rectal and colon specialist. Plaintiff never returned to the 
care of Dr. Dwyer after his revisionary surgery, and he has 
not undergone any further surgery. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 14, 1993, 
asserting medical malpractice and informed consent claims 
against Dr. Dwyer.3 Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Dwyer 
provided improper medical care in connection with his 
hospitalization, surgeries, and surgery after-care.4 As a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Prior to trial, plaintiff settled his claims against all defendants 
except 
Dr. Dwyer. 
 
4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Dwyer deviated from accepted 
standards of medical care in the following eleven situations: (1) by 
failing 
to conduct an antibiotic trial prior to his first surgery; (2) by failing 
to 
administer perioperative antibiotic and mechanical bowel preparation 
prior to the first surgery; (3) in the performance of the first surgery; 
(4) 
in the post-operative care given to plaintiff during his initial 
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result of this alleged negligence, plaintiff claimed that he 
suffered serious physical and psychological injuries and 
was left with an undesired, irreversible, and poorly 
functioning colostomy. He also claimed that Dr. Dwyer 
failed to secure plaintiff's informed consent for the first and 
second surgical procedures and that he suffered damages 
as a result of this breach. Plaintiff's wife, Emily Armstrong, 
filed a loss of consortium claim for losses she allegedly 
incurred as a result of her husband's alleged injuries. 
 
On October 6, 1994, plaintiff moved for an order 
"[c]ompelling the defendant William C. Dwyer to produce all 
documentation that he has received and all responses given 
to the Peer Review Organization, relating to his treatment of 
the plaintiff, Warren Armstrong."5 App. at 122-23. 
Defendant opposed this motion on the grounds that 
disclosure of this information was prohibited under the 
Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 
97-248, S 143, 96 Stat. 381 (1982) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. SS 1320c to 1320c-22 (1994)), and the so-called 
self-critical analysis privilege. By consent order dated 
December 2, 1994, the magistrate judge ordered that Peer 
Review Organization of New Jersey (PRO NJ) be permitted 
to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose of 
submitting a brief in response to plaintiff 's motion to 
compel. 
 
On January 26, 1995, the magistrate judge filed an 
opinion and order denying plaintiff's motion to compel the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
hospitalization; (5) by prematurely discharging plaintiff from the 
hospital 
after the first surgery; (6) by providing inadequate quality of care to 
plaintiff during the period in between his discharge from the first 
hospitalization and his admission to the second hospitalization; (7) by 
failing to perform surgery on plaintiff as soon as reasonably possible 
upon plaintiff's readmission; (8) in the performance of the second 
operation; (9) in the performance of the third operation; (10) in the 
location of the plaintiff's stoma; and (11) in the formation of 
plaintiff's 
stoma. 
 
5. Plaintiff became aware that Dr. Dwyer was the subject of a PRO 
inquiry after Dwyer's colleague, Dr. Richard Oliver, produced in response 
to plaintiff's subpoena two PRO documents identifying Dr. Dwyer and 
plaintiff. 
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production of peer review documents pertaining to Dr. 
Dwyer. The magistrate judge held that the documents 
requested were "absolutely immune from discovery" under 
the Act because "the responses to PRO inquiries, as well as 
the inquiries themselves[ ] were generated and created by 
the PRO . . . ." Magistrate Op. at 9. The magistrate further 
held that "the documents inadvertently produced by Dr. 
Oliver are also entitled to the statutory protection against 
disclosure."6 Id. Because the magistrate denied plaintiff's 
motion based on the Act, the judge did not consider 
whether the self-critical analysis privilege would prohibit 
disclosure of these documents. The district court 
subsequently entered an order affirming the magistrate 
judge's order in all respects. 
 
Plaintiff's claims were tried before the district court and 
a jury between February 19, 1997 and March 19, 1997. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Dwyer on all of 
his claims. The jury concluded that plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate that Dr. Dwyer breached his duty of informed 
consent or that he acted negligently in providing medical 
care to the plaintiff. The district court entered judgment on 
the jury's verdict on May 22, 1997. 
 
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff argued, 
inter alia, that the district court abused its discretion: (1) by 
denying the jury's request during deliberations for 
transcripts of depositions; and (2) by submitting to the jury 
interrogatories that did not require it to make separate 
determinations regarding each alleged act of medical 
negligence and each alleged failure by defendant to obtain 
plaintiff's informed consent prior to performing surgery 
upon him. The district court denied plaintiff 's motion. This 
appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the magistrate judge ordered that plaintiff return to Dr. 
Oliver the two documents that were produced at Dr. Oliver's deposition, 
and the district court affirmed this aspect of the magistrate's order, 
plaintiff has not raised this claim on appeal. 
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U.S.C. S 1332. This court has appellate jurisdiction of the 
district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
Our standard of review over the district court's decision 
not to provide transcripts of depositions to the jury during 
deliberations is under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1400 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Likewise, we review the court's formulation of jury 
interrogatories for abuse of discretion. In re Merritt Logan, 
Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 367 (3d Cir. 1990). Finally, while we 
generally review the denial of a motion to compel under the 
abuse of discretion standard, see Berger v. Edgewater Steel 
Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), 
our standard of review is plenary where the decision is 
based upon the interpretation of a legal precept. Cf. 
McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
III. 
 
A. Jury's Request for Deposition Transcripts  
 
During the jury's deliberations, the jury sent out the 
following question to the court: "We need a clarification on 
this issue: Are we entitled to review any or all of the 
depositions that are in evidence inside the jury room?" App. 
at 346. After consulting with counsel, the district judge 
determined that the jury sought transcripts of depositions, 
rather than transcripts of the deposition testimony read 
during trial or a readback of such testimony. Consequently, 
the district judge told the jury that he would not send the 
depositions into the jury room because they were not 
admitted into evidence. The court further instructed the 
jury that they should rely upon their collective recollection 
of the depositions that were read into evidence during trial 
and they should send out another question if the court did 
not satisfactorily answer their question. No further 
questions were submitted. 
 
Plaintiff contends that the district court abused its 
discretion "[b]y refusing the jury's request to review 
transcripts of deposition testimony entered in evidence, or 
alternatively, to permit readback of such testimony . . . ." 
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Plaintiff's Br. at 29 (citing United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
1384 (3d Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff argues that, while such a 
decision is committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court, a court's discretion is nevertheless circumscribed by 
two factors: "whether `(1) such requests may slow the trial 
where the requested testimony is lengthy; (2) [and] when 
read only a portion of testimony, the jury may give undue 
weight to that portion.' " Id. (quoting Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 
1400). According to plaintiff, the district court abused its 
discretion because its ruling was not bottomed on either of 
these concerns. 
 
Plaintiff's argument merits little discussion. As the 
district court correctly observed, the jury did not ask for 
written transcripts of testimony or a readback of such 
testimony. Instead, the jury requested transcripts of the 
actual depositions. Because the deposition transcripts were 
never admitted into evidence, however, we cannot conclude 
that the district court abused its discretion by refusing the 
jury's request. 
 
B. Jury Interrogatories 
 
Plaintiff next claims that the district court abused its 
discretion by refusing to accept his proposed jury 
interrogatories, which would have required the jury to make 
findings with respect to each of the eleven alleged incidents 
of medical malpractice and both of the alleged incidents 
regarding informed consent. The district court rejected this 
proposal in favor of the following interrogatories: 
 
       Question 1. Warren Armstrong's Negligence/Medical 
       Malpractice Claim 
 
        A. Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of t he 
       evidence that the defendant Dr. William Dwyer was 
       negligent in providing medical services to the plaintiff? 
 
        B. Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of t he 
       evidence that the defendant's negligence was a 
       proximate cause of some injury and consequent 
       damage sustained by the plaintiff? 
 
       Question 2. Walter Armstrong's Informed Consent 
       Claim 
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        A. Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the 
       evidence that the defendant failed to comply with his 
       disclosure duty? 
 
        B. Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of t he 
       evidence that the defendant's failure to comply with his 
       disclosure duty was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
       injuries? 
 
App. at 270-71. 
 
In rejecting plaintiff's proposed malpractice 
interrogatories, the court stated: 
 
        I understand your point, but you're making the jury's 
       job interminably difficult. Obviously the jury sat here 
       for many days, they listened for example to not only 
       your cross-examination of the witnesses produced by 
       defendant, but Dr. McConnell and they heard his 
       testimony in which he opined in which way he thought 
       Dr. Dwyer had been negligent. 
 
        I don't recall whether it was one, five, seven or ten. 
       The point is they heard it. In there--in evaluating their 
       case, your case, they will be in a position to determine 
       whether it's one, three, four, five or ten instances in 
       which the plaintiff proved, by the requisite standard of 
       proof, that Dr. Dwyer was negligent. 
 
        It seems to me that my charge, and in my considered 
       judgment, adequately gives them an opportunity to 
       consider all of these charges and make a 
       determination, whether individually or in the aggregate, 
       you demonstrated Dr. Dwyer was negligent and that 
       his negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. 
       Armstrong's injuries. 
 
        So while I understand what you would like to do, it 
       presents problems which, to coin a phrase, is of Mt. 
       Everest proportions in my judgment and I'm not going 
       to do that. 
 
App. at 278-79. The court employed similar reasoning when 
rejecting plaintiff's proposed informed consent 
interrogatories. 
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Plaintiff contends that the district court abused its 
discretion by "merg[ing] the numerous factual issues in the 
case into two vague and broad special interrogatories." 
Plaintiff 's Br. at 33. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that 
 
       the interrogatories put to the jury did not fairly present 
       the material factual questions. Nothing in Question 1A 
       apprised the jury that it was expected to consider 
       eleven separate deviations in the standard of care 
       alleged to have been committed by Dwyer and testified 
       to by plaintiff's expert weeks earlier. In the same way, 
       Question 2A did not indicate that the informed consent 
       inquiry applied to two separate procedures. 
 
Plaintiff's Br. at 34-35. Once again, plaintiff's argument 
must fail. 
 
As noted above, the formulation of jury interrogatories is 
entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge. See In re 
Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d at 367; McNally v. Nationwide 
Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1987). " `The only limitation 
[on this discretion] is that the questions asked of the jury 
be adequate to determine the factual issues essential to the 
judgment.' " McNally, 815 F.2d at 266 (quoting Kornicki v. 
Calmar S.S. Co., 460 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1972)). In 
the present matter, the interrogatories submitted to the 
jury clearly satisfy this standard. By asking whether 
plaintiff adduced sufficient proof that defendant acted 
negligently in providing medical care to plaintiff and 
whether defendant breached his duty of informed consent, 
as well as whether such negligence or breach proximately 
caused some injury to plaintiff, the court properly asked 
the jury to determine the factual issues essential to the 
judgment. The district judge was not obliged to distill these 
issues with any greater clarity. 
 
C. Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982 
 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 
two respects by affirming the magistrate judge's order 
denying plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to produce 
all documents received by defendant from the PRO 
concerning his treatment of the plaintiff and his responses 
thereto. First, plaintiff contends that, while the Act "excepts 
from discovery documents `produced by' a PRO `in 
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connection with its deliberations[,]' " Plaintiff's Br. at 42 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. S 1320c-9(d)), the documents at issue 
here do not fall within this limited category because they 
consist of "discovery from a target physician of inquiries 
and notices transmitted to him by the PRO and 
communications sent by the target physician to the PRO in 
response." Id. Second, plaintiff contends that the 
redisclosure regulation, 42 C.F.R. S 476.107(g), requires 
defendant to produce these documents because the PRO 
"voluntarily shared allegedly `confidential' documents with 
Dwyer . . . ." Plaintiff's Br. at 49. We will address each 
argument in turn. 
 
       1. Discovery Barred Under The Act 
 
        a. Origin and Function of the PRO and PRO NJ 
 
Congress enacted the Medicare program in 1965 to 
establish a federally funded system of health insurance 
benefits for the aged and disabled. See Social Security 
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 1395 to 1395ccc 
(1994)). In 1982, Congress amended the Medicare statute 
by enacting the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-248, S 143, 96 Stat. 381 (1982), which 
established "a new method of reviewing the quality and 
appropriateness of the health care provided . . . to Medicare 
beneficiaries." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 
1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Act requires that the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) enter into 
contracts with "peer review organization," or PROs, private 
organizations of doctors that review, inter alia, whether 
medical services "were reasonable and medically necessary" 
and whether "the quality of such services meets 
professionally recognized standards of health care .. . ." 42 
U.S.C. S 1320c-3(a)(1)(A), (B). "In essence, the Act functions 
as a quality and fiscal check upon the medical services of 
physicians and institutions which provide health care 
services under the Medicare and Medicaid programs." Todd 
v. South Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676, 685 (D.N.J. 
1993). 
 
PRO NJ is a PRO incorporated in the State of New Jersey. 
PRO NJ was successful in obtaining the first contract with 
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the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the 
HHS and has maintained a contract for Medicare Peer 
Review in the State of New Jersey since 1984 on a 
continuous basis. Prior to 1984, the predecessor to PRO 
NJ, The Southern New Jersey Professional Standards 
Review Organization, and Area VII Physician's Review 
Organization, Inc., maintained Medicare peer review 
contracts with HHS. 
 
        b. PRO NJ's Quality Review and Sanction Process 
 
PRO NJ has adopted the following procedures to 
determine whether a quality issue exists with respect to the 
care of a Medicare beneficiary. At the outset, a nurse 
employed by the PRO screens a medical record to determine 
whether a potential or possible quality question might exist. 
If the nurse determines that such a question exists, the 
case is referred to a physician-reviewer of the PRO, who 
then reviews the matter and determines whether there is, in 
fact, a potential quality issue. 
 
If the physician-reviewer determines that there is a 
potential quality issue, the PRO prepares a quality inquiry 
and issues it to the physician in question. The PRO also 
requests a response from the physician. The physician 
generally responds in writing to the quality inquiry by 
submitting to the PRO a response on the same notice form. 
Following receipt of the response form from the physician in 
question, the matter is once again reviewed by the 
physician-reviewer, who then determines whether there is a 
confirmed quality problem. If there is no quality problem, 
an acceptance notice is issued and no further action is 
taken. However, if there is a confirmed quality problem, the 
PRO may request further action on the part of a physician. 
Such action may include a referral to the Sanction 
Committee of the PRO, a standing committee of the PRO, 
for additional review and a determination as to whether or 
not a preliminary determination should be made that a 
sanctionable offense has occurred.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. There are generally two types of sanctionable offenses: a "gross and 
flagrant violation" and a "substantial violation in a substantial number 
of cases." The former offense means that "a violation of an obligation has 
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In the event that the Sanction Committee makes a 
preliminary determination that a sanctionable offense 
occurred, a notice is issued to the physician in question, 
along with an invitation to meet with the PRO of the New 
Jersey Sanction Committee (in the case of a gross and 
flagrant violation) or to respond in writing (in the case of a 
substantial violation). If a meeting is held with the Sanction 
Committee, a court reporter is in attendance. Also in 
attendance is the physician in question, the physician's 
attorney (if desired), the physician's expert witnesses (if 
any), and members of the Sanction Committee together 
with supporting staff. 
 
Following the sanction meeting, the Sanction Committee 
deliberates and reaches a determination as to whether or 
not the previous preliminary determination should be 
affirmed, modified, or reversed. In the event that the 
preliminary determination is affirmed, the physician is 
given an opportunity to enter into a corrective action plan, 
assuming that the physician is willing and able to meet his 
statutory obligations and the matter before the committee 
is not considered egregious in nature. Communications 
between the PRO and the physician then follow, at which 
time the parties will generally agree upon an approved 
educational plan which is then implemented by the 
physician. 
 
In cases considered egregious, or in cases where there is 
an established pattern of care, the PRO may refer the 
matter to the New Jersey Office of Inspector General. In 
that case, a sanction report is prepared and issued to the 
Office of Inspector General, which contains all of the 
information upon which the Sanction Committee relied in 
reaching its determination. A copy of the sanction report is 
provided to the physician in question, who has a right to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
occurred in one or more instances which presents an imminent danger 
to health, safety, or well-being of a program patient or places the 
program patient unnecessarily in high-risk situations." 42 C.F.R. 
S 1004.1. The latter means "a pattern of providing care . . . that is 
inappropriate, unnecessary, or does not meet recognized professional 
standards of care, or is not supported by the necessary documentation 
of care as required by the PRO." Id. 
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respond to the Office of Inspector General within thirty 
days of receipt. 
 
At the conclusion of a quality inquiry with PRO NJ, the 
physician in question will generally have substantial 
documentation in his or her file. This documentation may 
include: (1) the initial quality assurance inquiry; (2) the 
physician's response; (3) additional correspondence 
regarding the quality issue; (4) a sanction notice, which 
includes a quality assurance review sheet, a medical 
director's committee review sheet, and other information 
upon which the PRO bases its preliminary determination 
regarding a sanctionable offense; (5) the physician's written 
response to the sanction notice; (6) various correspondence 
related to the sanction process; (7) a determination by the 
Sanction Committee; (8) correspondence regarding the 
corrective action plan; and (9) a certification of completion 
of the corrective action plan. 
 
        c. Confidentiality of PRO Information  
 
The Act reflects a strong policy of confidentiality with 
respect to a PRO's quality review and sanction process. The 
Act requires a PRO to hold all data and information that it 
acquires in confidence and, subject to only limited 
exceptions, prohibits a PRO from disclosing such 
information. See 42 U.S.C. S 1320c-9(a). Congress has even 
exempted PROs from the requirements of the Freedom of 
Information Act. See id. In addition, any person who 
discloses information in violation of the Act's confidentiality 
provisions is subject to criminal penalties including a fine 
and imprisonment of not more than six months. See 42 
U.S.C. S 1320c-9(c). Finally, to further protect the 
confidentiality of PRO-related materials, the Act immunizes 
many documents from subpoena and discovery 
proceedings: 
 
       No patient record in the possession of an organization 
       having a contract with the Secretary under this part 
       shall be subject to subpoena or discovery proceeding in 
       a civil action. No document or other information 
       produced by such an organization in connection with 
       its deliberations in making determinations under 
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       section 1320c-3(a)(1)(B) or 1320c-5(a)(2) of this title 
       shall be subject to subpoena or discovery in any 
       administrative or civil proceeding; except that such an 
       organization shall provide, upon request of a 
       practitioner or other person adversely affected by such 
       a determination, a summary of the organization's 
       findings and conclusions in making the determination. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1320c-9(d). 
 
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act further 
buttress these confidentiality provisions. The regulations 
broadly define confidential information as "(1) [i]nformation 
that explicitly or implicitly identifies an individual patient, 
practitioner or reviewer[;] (2) [s]anction reports and 
recommendations[;] (3) [q]uality review studies which 
identify patients, practitioners or institutions[;] (4) PRO 
deliberations." 42 C.F.R. S 476.101(b). Furthermore, "PRO 
information" includes any information "collected, acquired 
or generated by a PRO in the exercise of its duties and 
functions . . . ." Id. 
 
The regulations impose specific requirements to ensure 
the confidentiality of PRO information. For example, a PRO 
must provide physical security measures to protect PRO 
information, including measures necessary to secure 
computer files. See 42 C.F.R. S 476.115(a). The PRO must 
furnish confidentiality training and instructions to 
participants in PRO activities, and must designate an 
individual responsible for maintaining the system of 
assuring confidentiality. See 42 C.F.R. S 476.115(a) (c). 
Only persons who have completed a training program and 
signed a statement indicating that they understand the 
penalties for unauthorized disclosure are permitted access 
to confidential information. See 42 C.F.R. S 476.115(d). In 
addition, the regulations require a PRO to purge files of 
personal identifiers as soon as such identifiers are no 
longer necessary, to destroy hard copies of documents that 
are no longer needed, and to assure that other 
organizations providing data services to the PRO have 
established procedures to maintain confidentiality. See 42 
C.F.R. S 476.115(e). 
 
Even where the disclosure of information by a PRO is 
authorized, the regulations establish procedures to protect 
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confidentiality. A disclosure requires an accompanying 
notice and statement advising the recipient of the 
limitations on permissible redisclosure. See 42 C.F.R. 
S 476.104. With certain enumerated exceptions, the 
regulations prohibit any person who obtains confidential 
PRO information from redisclosing it. See 42 C.F.R. 
S 476.107. 
 
These extensive provisions reflect a clear congressional 
policy of protecting the confidentiality of information related 
to PRO proceedings. This policy is consistent with"the 
underlying purpose of the federal and state peer review 
statutes, which is to encourage doctors to evaluate their 
peers honestly, without fear that the proceedings might 
later be used in a lawsuit." Todd, 152 F.R.D. at 686 (citing 
Morse v. Gerity, 520 F. Supp. 470, 471 (D. Conn. 1981)). 
An assurance of confidentiality is essential to facilitate the 
open communication necessary for a PRO to perform its 
duties. The Executive Vice President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the PRO NJ submitted an affidavit stating that 
without confidentiality, the organization "would have great 
difficulty functioning and great difficulty obtaining 
information now volunteered from physicians to whom 
quality inquiries are advanced." App. at 167. See also 
General Care Corp. v. Mid-South Foundation for Medical 
Care, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 405, 417 n.10 (W.D. Tenn. 1991). 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Congress has 
clearly created a statutory scheme that is highly protective 
of information related to PRO proceedings. 
 
        d. Analysis 
 
As noted above, plaintiff contends that this section does 
not bar discovery of the documents at issue because these 
documents were not " `produced by' a PRO `in connection 
with its deliberations.' " Plaintiff 's Br. at 42 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. S 1320c-9(d)). Specifically, plaintiff argues that: (1) 
correspondence from the PRO cannot be said to be "in 
connection with [PRO] deliberations" because these 
documents "do not include minutes and deliberations 
whose protection from discovery is the heart of critical self- 
analysis[,]" id. at 43; and (2) documents written by a 
"target" physician cannot be considered "generated" by the 
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PRO. Id. at 46. We conclude that plaintiff's reading of the 
phrase "produced by [the PRO] in connection with its 
deliberations" is far too narrow. 
 
"In passing the 1982 amendments, Congress painted 
with a broad brush, leaving HHS to fill in many important 
details of the workings of peer review." Bowen, 834 F.2d at 
1043; see id. at 1043 (observing that Congress provided 
"skeletal requirements . . . and left much of the specifics 
. . . to the inventiveness of the HHS, empowering it to 
promulgate regulations governing PROs in order to 
implement the peer review program." (citation omitted)). 
Two relevant details that HHS filled in are the definitions of 
"PRO deliberations" and "PRO information." The Secretary 
defines "PRO deliberations" as 
 
       discussions or communications (within a PRO or 
       between a PRO and a PRO subcontractor) including, 
       but not limited to, review notes, minutes of meetings 
       and any other records of discussions and judgments 
       involving review matters regarding PRO review 
       responsibilities and appeals from PRO determinations, 
       in which the opinions of, or judgments about, a 
       particular individual or institution can be discerned. 
 
42 C.F.R. S 476.101(b). "PRO information" is defined as 
"any data or information collected, acquired or generated by 
a PRO in the exercise of its duties and functions . . . ." Id. 
 
When PRO NJ's quality review and sanction process is 
viewed in light of these broad definitions, it is clear the 
quality review inquiry sent by the PRO to Dwyer were 
generated by the PRO in connection with its deliberations. 
The physician-reviewer sent this inquiry to Dwyer after 
determining that there was, in fact, a potential quality issue 
regarding Dwyer's treatment of plaintiff. Moreover, the 
physician-reviewer asked Dwyer to respond to the inquiry. 
Once Dwyer responded to the inquiry, the physician- 
reviewer had to consider whether to end the inquiry and 
send an acceptance notice to Dwyer or to refer the matter 
to the Sanction Committee of the PRO. Regardless of which 
course was ultimately taken in this particular case, the 
physician-reviewer had to render a judgement on the 
quality of care Dwyer provided to plaintiff. He thus engaged 
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in the deliberative process within the meaning of the Act, 
and the inquiry sent to Dwyer was certainly "in connection 
with" such deliberations. 
 
Moreover, while the status of Dr. Dwyer's responses to 
the PRO inquiry presents a closer question, we conclude 
that this information was also generated by the PRO in 
connection with its deliberations. The physician-reviewer 
specifically requested that Dwyer assist the PRO by 
responding to its quality review inquiry. See 42 C.F.R. 
S 476.101(b) (" `PRO review system' means the PRO and 
those organizations and individuals who . . . assist the 
PRO[, and includes] . . . Health care institutions and 
practitioners whose services are reviewed."). Moreover, 
Dwyer's responses were generated solely as a result of, and 
during the course of, the PRO's quality review. As the 
district court aptly noted, 
 
       Documents utilized by the PRO in the course of its 
       quality inquiry--medical records for example--are 
       discoverable for [sic] any source other than the PRO 
       that might have them. However, documents generated 
       or created by the PRO are not discoverable from any 
       source. Thus, the documents generated by the PRO are 
       absolutely privileged but documents which are 
       generated for another purpose, but which the PRO 
       review in the course of investigating the doctor are not. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7 (citing Todd, 152 F.R.D. at 687, 698). 
Thus, the PRO generated these responses, which were 
inextricably linked to the PRO review process and allowed 
the PRO to perform its responsibilities under the Act. 
Consequently, Dwyer's responses to the PRO inquiry are 
not subject to subpoena or discovery. 
 
In addition, the fact that plaintiffs sought to compel these 
documents from Dwyer, rather than the PRO, does not alter 
this outcome. Congress provided that the documents or 
information generated by the PRO in the course of its 
statutory duties is not subject to subpoena or discovery. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 1320c-9(d). The bar against discovery runs 
with the documents or information, not with the 
organization or individuals who happen to possess the 
documents or information at any given time. But see Todd, 
 
                                18 
  
152 F.R.D. at 686 ("This court finds, therefore, that the 
Peer Review Protect [sic] Act bars production of documents 
solely as they exist in the possession of the Peer Review 
Organization."). Indeed, to hold otherwise would necessarily 
render the statute's mandate of confidentiality a nullity 
because a subject physician will have most, if not all, of the 
materials related to the inquiry within his possession. 
Thus, the absolute prohibition against discovery of these 
materials is not destroyed simply because the materials, or 
copies of the materials, are in the hands of the physician 
who is the subject of the PRO quality review inquiry and 
part of the PRO review system. Accordingly, plaintiff's 
argument must fail.8 
 
       2. Redisclosure Not Authorized Under 42 C.F.R. 
       S 476.107(g) 
 
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that, even assuming the 
documents or information at issue are not subject to 
subpoena or discovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1320c-9(d), 
the regulations governing redisclosure of confidential PRO 
information require the production of the documents at 
issue. Specifically, plaintiff argues that 
 
       42 C.F.R. S 476.107(g) provides that redisclosure of 
       PRO documents from a practitioner is permissible once 
       the PRO has, as in this case, revealed its documents to 
       him. This outcome is dictated by the extinction of any 
       rationale for the continuation of alleged confidentiality 
       once divulgence has occurred and by equity and 
       fairness. This outcome is further dictated in this case 
       by the absence of any reasoned basis for granting 
       derivative immunity to physician-authored documents 
       merely on account of their transmittal to the PRO. The 
       district court's recognition of privilege under those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although plaintiff suggests in his brief that he also sought production 
of a corrective action plan from defendant, it is not clear from the 
record 
whether this claim was made below. However, in light of our conclusions 
with respect to the PRO inquiry sent to Dwyer, and Dwyer's response 
thereto, such a document (assuming it even exists) would 
unquestionably be deemed a document generated by the PRO in 
connection with its deliberations. 
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       circumstances constituted reversible error which 
       requires rectification by the Court. 
 
Plaintiff's Br. at 50. Once again, plaintiff's argument must 
fail. 
 
The redisclosure regulation provides in pertinent part 
that "[p]ersons or organizations that obtain confidential 
PRO information must not further disclose the information 
to any other person or organization except . . . (g) 
[i]nformation pertaining to a patient or practitioner may be 
disclosed by that individual provided it does not identify 
any other patient or practitioner . . . ." 42 C.F.R. 
S 476.107(g) (emphasis added). In the present matter, Dr. 
Dwyer has never authorized disclosure of the documents. 
Moreover, disclosure of the PRO documents to defendant 
and his counsel did not effectuate a "waiver" of the bar 
against discovery of these materials. This is not a common 
law privilege to which the traditional concept of waiver 
applies. Congress deemed that documents or information 
produced by the PRO in connection with a quality review 
study shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery. 
Nothing within this statute supports plaintiff 's contention 
that this discovery bar may be waived.9  
 
IV. 
 
We will affirm the March 22, 1997 judgment of the 
district court in all respects. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In light of the foregoing conclusions, we also conclude that the 
district 
court properly denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. See Bertoli, 40 
F.3d at 1392 (denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). 
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